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NOTE
EXPANDING ACCESS TO
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR
TREATMENT USE: A POLICY

ANALYSIS AND
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Austin Winnifordt
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2001, after a year and a half of increasingly ineffective
chemotherapy treatments, 21 year old Abigail Burroughs ran out of
FDA approved options for treating her head and neck cancer.'
Abigail's oncologist at Johns Hopkins University told her and her
father, Frank Burroughs, that there was a significant chance of saving
Abigail's life if she could obtain the new cancer drug Erbitux, which
was showing promising results in the clinical testing phase of development. z As early as 2000, there was compelling data that Erbitux
was effective for treating head and neck cancer, including elimination
of cancer in 87% of subjects in early clinical trials. Abigail did not
qualify for a clinical trial because of the nature of her cancer, and despite significant efforts on behalf of her family, physician, and supporters over a seven-month period, she was unable to obtain Erbitux
for use outside of a clinical trial.4 Abigail died in June of 2001.5 The

t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2009;
M.A. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, 2009; B.A.,
New York University, 2006.
1 Complaint at 6-7, Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (No. 04-5350).
2 Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances,
FamiliesBattle an UncaringBureaucracy,LIFE EXTENSION, Sept. 2007, at 26.
3 En Banc Brief of Appellants at 12-13, Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach
(Abigail fl), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5350).
4 Id. at

9.

5 Complaint, supranote 1, at 7.
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FDA approved
Erbitux for the treatment of head and neck cancer five
6
years later.
In the 1990's, a high-dose chemotherapy plus autologous bone
marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT) began showing promise in early
clinical trials as a treatment for breast cancer. 7 After intensive political lobbying, threats of litigation, and media involvement, insurance
plans reluctantly agreed to cover the procedure, and more than 41,000
patients were able to obtain HDC-ABMT for treatment use outside of
a clinical trial.8 Because of this expanded access, investigators struggled to enroll a sufficient number of patients in a later phase of clinical trials for HDC-ABMT, extending the testing process years longer
than originally planned. 9 Finally, after reports of many women dying
from or being further disabled by this treatment, and after the cancer
of the majority of women who received the treatment had regressed or
progressed, randomized trial results indicated that HDC-ABMT offered° no benefit over conventional treatment, with far greater toxicl
ity.
These cases illustrate the potential benefits and risks of expanding
access to investigational drugs for treatment use and the flaws of the
FDA regulations of such use. Although there is no data to support the
claim, there is undoubtedly an unmet demand for investigational drugs
outside of clinical trials." For instance, more than 550,000 patients
die from cancer every year in the United States,' 2 and it is reasonable
to assume that a significant proportion of these patients run out of
effective approved treatment options at some point.' 3 Protocols for
clinical trials typically contain limited space and restrictive qualification criteria regarding a patient's condition and treatment history; only
3% of cancer patients in the United States are enrolled in clinical trials.' 4 In most cases, qualification criteria exclude patients who have
6 En Banc Brief of Appellants, supra note 3, at 14.
7 Shira Bender et al., Access for the Terminally Ill to Experimental Medical

Innovations. A Three-Pronged Threat, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Oct. 2007, at 3, 4.
8Id.
9 Musa Mayer, Listen to All the Voices: An Advocate's Perspective on Early
Access to Investigational Therapies, 3 CLINICAL TRIALS 149, 150 (2006).
10 Id.

1 Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, Dir. of Cardiology, Dir. of
the Ctr. for Advanced Heart and Vascular Care, Professor and Vice Chair of the Departments of Med. and Surgery, Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. (Feb. 17, 2008).
12 Manish Agrawal & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ethics of Phase 1 Oncology Studies: Reexamining the Arguments and Data, 290 JAMA 1075, 1075 (2003).
13 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 2008 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (Sept. 28, 2008) (No. 07-444).
14 Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at
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received numerous treatments, patients with co-morbidities, and
patients with recurrent cancer,1 5 yet these are often the patients in
greatest need. In addition, for a variety of reasons, existing FDA
mechanisms that allow patients to access investigational drugs outside
of a clinical trial do not accommodate the demand. 16 With a clinical
testing process that lasts an average of seven years, 7 the number of
cancer patients who could benefit from obtaining investigational drugs
outside of a clinical trial is potentially substantial. As the HDCABMT case illustrates, however, expanding access to investigational
drugs risks harming patients by treating them with unproven, potentially toxic substances, and harming the public by undermining the
integrity of clinical trials.
Despite the prominence of a recent court case 18 and proposed federal legislation 9 addressing these issues, the extent to which FDA
regulations restrict access to investigational drugs and whether public
policy supports these restrictions have not been thoroughly analyzed
in the legal, health policy, bioethics, or medical literature. The majority of the relatively recent and few articles that defend a position on
this issue briefly argue against expanding access to investigational
drugs for treatment use. 20 In this paper I will defend a contrary posiDRUG

15 See OVARIAN CANCER NATIONAL ALLIANCE, RESPONSE TO FOOD AND
ADMINISTRATION RULE 21 CFR PART 312 (2007), available at

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/06nOO62/06n-0062-EC57-Attach1.pdf.
16 Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
17 Id. at 2.

18 Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (AbigailI1), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (en banc).
19See Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act

(ACCESS Act), S. 1956, 10 9th Cong. (2005). See also CongressDaily, Lawmakers To
Reintroduce Bill Legalizing Terminally Ill Patients'Access To Experimental Medications, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Aug. 21, 2007 (stating that representatives from both
houses of Congress will likely reintroduce the ACCESS Act into the 110& Congress);
National Cancer Act of 2007, S. 1056, 110th Cong. (2007) (directing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to establish a new program to expand access to investigational treatments for cancer patients who have exhausted all approved therapies).
20 See, e.g., Bender et al., supra note 7; Mayer, supra note 9; George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution - Choice at Life's End, 357 NEw ENG. J.MED. 408
(2007); Peter D. Jacobsen & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of UnapprovedDrugs:
The Case of Abigail Alliance v Von Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205, 208 (2007); Soc'y
for Clinical Trials Bd. of Directors, The Society for Clinical Trials Opposes US Legislation to PermitMarketing of Unproven Medical Therapiesfor Seriously Ill Patients,
3 CLINICAL TRIALS 154, 155 (2006) ("[T]he approval process advocated in the Bill is
not in the best interests of the patients."); 0. Carter Snead, UnenumeratedRights and
the Limits of Analogy: A Critique of the Right to Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (2007), http://harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/may07/snead.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2008); Arthur Caplan, Is it Sound Public Policy to Let the Terminally
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tion and argue that FDA regulations of investigational drugs are overbroad in that they burden seriously and terminally ill patients with no
approved treatment options more than necessary to further the government's interest in protecting patient safety and promoting public
health. An unacceptable form of strong paternalism underlies FDA
regulations in their role of restricting access to investigational drugs in
order to protect the best interests of seriously and terminally ill patients. Moreover, Congress can enact legislation that eases the paternalistic restrictions on access without significantly jeopardizing patient safety or public health.
In Section II, I will summarize the recent effort to reform FDA
regulations of investigational drugs through the judiciary in Abigail
Alliance v. Eschenbach. Next, in Section III, I will outline the FDA's
regulations of investigational drugs and elaborate on how they restrict
access by discouraging industry involvement in expanded access programs. I describe the regulatory framework after I present the judicial
issue in order to help the reader transition into Section IV, where I
will assess whether the policies of protecting patient best interests and
promoting public health justify the FDA's restrictions on access to
investigational drugs. Concluding that they do not, in Section V, I
will outline my recommendations for legislation that eases restrictions
on access without undermining patient safety or public health.
Finally, in Section VI, I will briefly evaluate the ACCESS Act, legislation currently before Congress that would substantially expand
access to investigational drugs for treatment use.
II. INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS AND THE
CONSTITUTION
A. Case Background and the DC Circuit's Panel Decision
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
(the Alliance) is a non-profit patient advocacy group formed in support of expanded access to investigational drugs. Abigail Burroughs'
father, Frank Burroughs, formed the Alliance shortly after Abigail's
death in 2001.21 In mid-2003, the Alliance and the Washington Legal
Foundation sued the FDA Commissioner and the Secretary of the
Ill Access Experimental MedicalInnovations?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 1. But
see John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to Health
Care, 36 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15 (2006); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense,

Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Paymentfor Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1813 (2007).
21 See Kovach, supra note 2 at 26.

EXPANDING ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS

2009]

Department of Health and Human Services, claiming that FDA policies violate the rights to privacy and liberty in the Constitution by
interfering with the ability of Abigail Alliance patient-members and
other terminally ill patients to make medical treatment decisions.2 2
Though not clear from the complaint or the opinions, the Alliance was
specifically challenging two elements of the FDA's Treatment IND
regulations, which govern access to investigational drugs for treatment use: 23 1) the FDA's authority to deny access to an investigational
drug for treatment use if it determines that the drug is not sufficiently
safe or effective,24 and 2) the requirement that drug sponsors may not
charge more than cost recovery for an investigational drug,2 5 which
acts as a financial disincentive to making these drugs available outside
of a clinical trial.
After a DC District Court dismissed the Alliance's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 26 a threejudge panel for the DC Circuit Court reversed.27 The court held that
terminally ill patients with no remaining approved treatment options
have a constitutional right under the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause to access post-Phase I investigational drugs, and remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether FDA policies are narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 28 In
reaching its decision, the court applied the substantive due process
framework articulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg.29 There, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington state
law prohibiting assisted suicide by applying a three-part test for deriv-

22
23
24

Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
See infra Section III.A (describing the FDA's Treatment IND regulations).
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 15 ("FDA policy

is that [terminally ill patients who cannot get into a clinical trial) may seek access to
the drug outside of the trial, and a willing drug company may provide it, only if they
come to the FDA, fill out a mountain of regulatory paperwork, and convince FDA
officials that the likely benefits outweigh the risks.").
25 See, e.g., id. at 4 ("FDA regulations also forbid sponsors from 'charging a
price larger than that necessary to recover costs of manufacture, research, development, and handling of the investigational drug.") (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3)).
26 Abigail Alliance v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29594, at *36 (D.D.C., Aug. 30, 2004).
27 Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (Abigail 1), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) ("[W]here there are no alternative government-approved treatment options,
a terminally ill ... patient's informed access to potentially life-saving ... drugs determined by the FDA... to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials warrants
protection under the Due Process Clause."), vacated, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
28

Id.

29 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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ing substantive due process rights under the 14' h Amendment. 30 The
Court required a "careful description" of the asserted constitutional
right, 31 required the right to be "deeply rooted" in America's history
and traditions, 32 and
required the right to be "implicit in the concept of
33
ordered liberty.
Although the nature of the "careful description" requirement is
unclear, it is associated with a prohibition of deducing fundamental
rights from more abstract concepts of personal autonomy.34 In this
respect, it is designed to emphasize judicial restraint by ensuring that
judges frame the asserted right in a specific and narrow manner, and it
appears to be similar to the method for framing an asserted right articulated by Justice Scalia in the plurality opinion for Michael H. v.
GeraldD.35 There, a biological father who had formed an intermittent
relationship with his daughter filed an action to establish paternity and
visitation rights.3 6 His daughter was born out of wedlock after her
mother, married to another man, had an affair with the plaintiff.37 The
Court framed the issue by asking whether society has traditionally
protected the rights of the natural father of an adulterously conceived
child, concluding that it has not. 38 Alternatively, in the dissent, Justice
Brennan framed the issue by asking whether parenthood is a historically protected interest, concluding that it is. 39 In footnote six of the
plurality opinion, Scalia explained his methodology by stating: "[w]e
refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. ' '4° Notably, only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Scalia on footnote six. 4'
After the careful description requirement, the second element in
the Glucksberg test is that the asserted right must be "objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. ' 42 This element
30 Id.at 722-36.
31 Id.at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
32

Id.at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503

(1977)).

33Id.at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
34 See Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (Abigail I), 495 F.3d 695, 707
n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725).
35 See John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the Characterization of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 16 J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 418

(2005).

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 114 (1989).
3 Id. at 113-14.
38 Id.at 127 n.6.
39 Id.at 137, 141-42, 145 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
40 Id.at 127 n.6.
41 Id.at 113.
42 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore
36
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also attempts to create judicial restraint by reducing subjectivity in
substantive due process review. Third, fundamental rights must be
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed., 43 This element incorporates the notion that asserted rights should be morally important to
individuals or society, in addition to being rooted in history, in order
to be worthy of constitutional protection. 44 For example, although it is
a national tradition to display fireworks on the 4 th of July, this practice
is likely not sufficiently integral to liberty or justice to warrant constitutional protection. a
Applying these three elements, the circuit panel in Abigail Alliance "carefully" described the asserted right as "the right of terminally ill patients, acting on a doctor's advice, to obtain potentially lifesaving medication when no alternative treatment approved by the
government is available. ' "46 When inquiring whether this right is
rooted in the nation's history, however, the court strayed from its initial description, variously describing the right as "the right of control
over one's body[,] ' ' 47 "the right to self-defense[,]" ' 48 "the right to selfpreservation[,]"4 9 "the right to act in order to save one's own life[,] '
and the right "to assume any known or unknown risks of taking a
medication that might prolong . . . life."5' These alternative descriptions allowed the court to rely on the deep historical roots of certain
common law rights, including the right to self-defense, in finding that
the right asserted by the Alliance is rooted in national history and tradition.5 2 According to the court, where a terminally ill patient has
exhausted all approved treatment options, government interference
with his or her ability to access post-Phase I investigational drugs
53
violates the right to self-defense or the right to self-preservation.
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
43 Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
44 See Roy G. Spece, Jr., A Fundamental ConstitutionalRight of the Monied
to "Buy Out Of' Universal Health Care Program Restrictions Versus the Moral
Claim of Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An Unremitting Paradox of Health
Care Reform?, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICINE 1, 78 (2007).
45

Id.

Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (Abigail 1), 445 F.3d 470, 478 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), vacated, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
4 Id. at 480.
46

48

49
50

id.

Id,
Id. at 481 n.12.
"' Id. at 484.
52 Id. at 479-80 ("The absence of regulation could be attributable to a liberty
interest that is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition .....
" Id. at 480.
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The court also noted that regulating access to new drugs in the United
States is a relatively recent phenomenon: prior to 1906, there was
essentially no drug regulation in the United States, the government did
not mandate testing for drug safety until 1938, and it did not mandate
testing for drug efficacy until 1962. 4
Finally, the court determined that the right sought by the Alliance
is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, primarily because this
conclusion is implied by the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v.
Missouri Dept. of Health.5 5 In Cruzan, although the Supreme Court
affirmed Missouri's right to require clear and convincing evidence of
an incompetent patient's wishes before withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, it assumed and strongly suggested that the Due Process
Clause protects the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.56 The
circuit court in Abigail Alliance analogized the right claimed by the
Alliance to the right claimed in Cruzan by noting that neither right
obligates the government to provide anything; both merely obligate
the government not to interfere with a particular medical treatment
decision.5 7 In other words, both rights are negative rather than positive. The court then asserted that the same liberty interest that includes a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment must also include a
right to access potentially life-sustaining medication. 8 Although the
court did not make its reasoning transparent, the connection it established suggests that the Court in Cruzan derived the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment from a more general autonomy interest in
making personally significant medical treatment decisions free from
government interference. Thus, if the right to make medical treatment
decisions resulting in death is significant enough to warrant constitutional protection, then the right to make medical treatment decisions
that potentially prolong life should also be significant enough to warrant constitutional protection.
B. The DC Circuit's En Banc Decision
The DC Circuit vacated the panel's decision on November 21,
2006 and agreed to rehear the case en banc.59 On August 7, 2007, the
en banc court affirmed the initial decision of the district court, holding

SId. at 481-82.
5 Id. at 483-84.
56 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
" Abigail1,445 F.3d at 484.
58

Id. at 484-85.

59 Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
28974, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006).
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that the Due Process Clause does not protect the right sought by the
Alliance and that the challenged FDA policy is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. 60 The court pointed out that the dissenting
opinion, which was written by the same judge and is nearly identical
to the vacated panel opinion, strays from the careful description
requirement in its various broad descriptions of the right at issue.61
Nonetheless, the court directly addressed many of the dissent's arguments. In response to the panel's analogy to the common law right to
self-defense, the court stated that the right to self-defense only justifies the use of a reasonable amount of force against an aggressor. 62
According to the court, because the Alliance seeks a right to take
drugs with significant risks and no proven therapeutic effect, taking an
investigational drug prior to Phase II trials does not involve the use of
reasonable force in self-defense. 63 The court also concluded that regulating drugs for safety and efficacy is deeply rooted in the history and
traditions of the United States, citing numerous instances of drug
regulation throughout the nation's history that the panel and dissent
overlooked. 64 Moreover, the court noted that a mere failure to regulate does not indicate the existence of a fundamental right; it merely
illustrates that Congress has responded to new risks presented by
evolving technology.65
Because the court concluded that a right to access investigational
drugs is not deeply rooted in the nation's history, it did not decide
whether this right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 66 The
court noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Cruzan based the
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment on the common-law rule that
forced medication is battery. 67 According to the court, because the
Alliance does not seek freedom from forced medical treatment, the
panel's analogy to Cruzan under the ordered liberty element was misguided. Concluding that the right claimed by the Alliance is not fundamental, the court then noted that unapproved, potentially toxic
60 Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (Abigail I), 495 F.3d 695, 695, 713
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
61 See id. at 701 n.5 (stating that the dissent recasts the proposed right away

from the terms used in oral argument into a right "to try to save one's life" in tension
with the careful description requirement).
62 Id. at 709-10.
63 Id. But see Volokh, supra note 20 (defending use of investigational drugs
by seriously and terminally ill patients with no approved treatment options as a legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense deserving constitutional protection).
'" See Abigail II, 495 F.3d at 710-11.
65 See id. at 711.
66 Id. at 711 n.19.
67 Id. at 712 n.19 (citations omitted).
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drugs can harm even the terminally ill.68 For example, these drugs
may hasten their death or increase their suffering due to adverse sideeffects. Thus, the court held that FDA regulations are rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including
the terminally ill, from being harmed by unapproved drugs.69
Although several Supreme Court cases are in tension, if not inconsistent with the careful description requirement and the associated
prohibition of deducing rights from more abstract concepts related to
personal autonomy,7 ° the Supreme Court denied the Alliance's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 14, 2008. 71 Apparently, the
Court either did not perceive this tension or chose not to address it. In
any event, the Abigail Alliance case illustrates that courts are not
likely to protect a constitutional right to freedom from government
interference with the pursuit of investigational medical treatment.
Thus, proponents of expanded access to investigational drugs should
pursue reform through legislation. The debate now shifts to Congress,
where legislation such as the ACCESS Act threatens to change the
regulatory framework governing investigational drugs.72

68 Id. at
69 id.

713.

70 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (deducing the specific right to

terminate a pregnancy from a broader right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-86 (deducing a specific right to use contraception from a broader right
to be free from government intrusion into the marital bedroom); Eisenstadt v. Baird
405 U.S. 438, 453 (deducing a specific right to use contraception from a broader right
to be free from governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to have a child); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (suggesting that the 14 Amendment's conception of liberty
encompasses "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy"); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-68 (overruling a decision that upheld a state law prohibiting
sodomy because the Court previously framed the asserted right too narrowly, failing
to appreciate the extent of liberty at stake). For discussion of these inconsistencies,
see generally, Basiak, supra note 35; B. Jessie Hill, The ConstitutionalRight to Make
Medical Treatment Decisions:A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 281-82
(2007); Lee Goldman, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 601
(2006); Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance:Substantive Due Process
since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REv. 409 (2006).
71 Supreme Court of the United States Online Docket, Docket No. 07-444,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-444.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
72 The ACCESS Act creates an auxiliary mechanism for drug approval that is
designed to facilitate access to new drugs to seriously and terminally ill patients with
no approved treatment options. Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously
Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109 th Cong. (2005). See also Section VI, infra (describing
and evaluating the ACCESS Act).
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Il. FDA REGULATIONS OF INVESTIGATIONAL
DRUGS
A. The Black-Letter Law
In 1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), prohibiting drug manufacturers from introducing a new drug
into interstate commerce before it receives approval from the FDA.73
In order to introduce a new drug, the drug's sponsor must first submit
to the FDA an Investigational New Drug (IND) application, which
includes results from animal and in vitro testing establishing that human testing is appropriate.74 Next, the sponsor must conduct a series
of clinical investigations to establish the safety and efficacy of the
drug in human populations and submit the results to the FDA in a
New Drug Application.7 5 Pursuant to FDCA authority, the FDA has
instituted a three-phase testing process.76 Phase I trials introduce the
new drug into the human population, typically involve 20 to 80 subjects, and are primarily designed to determine the drug's maximum
tolerable dose and likely short-term side-effects. 77 Phase II trials typically involve several hundred subjects and are designed to evaluate
the drug's effectiveness in treating a particular disease and to further
evaluate the drug's short term side-effects.78 Finally, Phase III trials
are typically randomized and controlled, involve several thousand
subjects and are designed to collect additional information about
safety and effectiveness and to provide an adequate basis for labeling. 79 On average, the clinical trial process lasts seven years, and the
entire drug development process costs the drug manufacturer nearly
one billion dollars.80
FDA exceptions to the standard approval procedures for new
drugs fall into one of two categories: expedited review and expanded
access. Expedited review involves expediting or shortening the review process and is not the subject of this paper. Expanded access
7' 21 U.S.C.
74 21 C.F.R.

§ 355(a) (2000).
§ 312.23 (2008).

7' 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000).
76 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008).
77 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) ("[Phase I] studies are designed to determine the
metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness.").
78 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
'9 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
so Groopman, supra note 14, at 2 (also noting that it typically takes 6.5 years
for a drug manufacturer to gather enough data for IND testing approval).
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involves providing access to investigational drugs for treatment use
outside of a clinical trial. The primary mechanism for expanded access is the Treatment IND, 8' also known as an expanded access protocol or a compassionate use protocol. In 1987, in response to political
pressure from AIDS patients desperate for access to unapproved
treatments, the FDA amended its IND regulations to include the
Treatment IND. 82 A Treatment IND allows a drug sponsor or investigator to develop a protocol primarily designed to treat a single patient
or group of patients with an investigational drug. 83 The FDA will
generally approve a Treatment IND for seriously ill patients as early
as during Phase III trials, and for terminally ill patients as early as
during Phase II trials, if the following conditions are met: 1) the drug
is intended to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening disease;
2) there is no satisfactory treatment alternative for the intended patient
population; 3) the drug is under investigation in a clinical trial or all
trials have been completed; 4) the sponsor of the clinical trial is pursuing marketing approval with due diligence; and 5) there is sufficient
evidence of safety and effectiveness to support using the drug for
treatment. 84 Significantly, a sponsor, usually a pharmaceutical com81

The Parallel Track mechanism provides another means of expanded ac-

cess, though specific to the treatment of AIDS and other HIV related diseases. Parallel Track studies run concurrently with traditional clinical investigations, but investigators conduct these studies without experimental controls, allowing patients who
cannot gain entrance into a clinical trial to access the investigational drug. Peter M.
Currie, Restricting Access to unapproved Drugs: A Compelling Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 315 (2006/2007).
82 Groopman, supra note 14, at 3.
83 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34(a)-.35 (2008).
84 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a)-(b) (not defining "serious" disease, and defining
"immediately life-threatening" disease as "a stage of a disease in which there is a
reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which
premature death is likely without early treatment."). The FDA's proposed regulations
of investigational drugs for treatment use discuss the definition of "serious disease:
"the 'serious disease or condition' requirement refers to conditions that have an important effect on functioning (e.g., stroke, schizophrenia, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis) or on other aspects of quality of life (e.g., chronic depression, seizures).
Alzheimer's dementia, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), and narcolepsy are
specific examples of serious conditions for which FDA has granted expanded access
to investigational drugs in the past. Short-lived and self-limiting morbidity will usually not be sufficient to qualify a condition as serious, but the morbidity need not be
irreversible, provided it is persistent or recurrent. Similarly, the proposed requirement
here that treatment be for a "serious disease or condition" is not intended to be unnecessarily restrictive. It is primarily intended to exclude expanded access to investigational drugs for conditions that are clearly not serious (e.g., symptomatic relief of
minor pain or allergic symptoms and other self-limiting conditions not associated
with major morbidity). Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use,
71 Fed. Reg. 75147, 75151 (Dec. 14, 2006).
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pany, may not "commercialize an investigational drug by charging a
price larger than that necessary to recover costs of manufacture,
research, development, and handling of the investigational drug. 85
Likely responding to political pressure from the DC Circuit's initial decision in Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, the FDA proposed
regulations amending its current Treatment IND regulations in
December of 2006.86 According to the FDA, these proposed regulations are meant to clarify and codify, rather than change the agency's
existing regulations.87 Indeed, the regulations themselves state that
the FDA expects that "the overall impact of the proposed rule will not
be significant." 88 The only noteworthy revisions are the division of
expanded access protocols into individual, small group and large
group protocols, and the linking of the level of evidence required to
support the use of an investigational drug with the number of patients
likely to be treated.89 In any event, as of writing this paper, the FDA
has not adopted the proposed regulations. The following section illustrates that the consequences of maintaining the FDA's current regulations are more adverse to access to investigational drugs than initially
appears.
B. The Restrictive Implications of FDA Regulations for Access to
Investigational Drugs
FDA regulations restrict access to investigational drugs for treatment use in several ways, some of which are not immediately apparent from the content of the regulations. First, it is apparent that the
FDA will deny access if the drug is not intended to treat seriously or
terminally ill patients, if the patients to be treated have an approved
treatment option, or if the drug sponsor is not pursuing marketing approval through clinical trials with due diligence. 90 Libertarian views
aside, these are relatively uncontroversial provisions that do not warrant further discussion. Second, the FDA will deny access if evidence
indicates that the drug is not sufficiently safe or effective, and typically will not grant access prior to Phase II testing due to safety con-

85 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3) (2008).
86

See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed.

Reg. 75147.
87 Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees at 12, Abigail
Alliance v.
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-5350).
88 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use,
71 Fed.
Reg. 75147, 75158 (Dec. 14, 2006).
89

Id. at 75152-75155.

90 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a)-(b) (2008).
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cerns. 9 1 According to both the FDA and advocacy groups that support
expanded access, however, these provisions are not the major obstacles to access. 92 More importantly, drug sponsors, typically pharmaceutical companies, must voluntarily participate in Treatment ND's,
and FDA regulations create several disincentives to sponsors making
their investigational drugs available outside of a clinical trial.93 The
most significant disincentive is the provision prohibiting sponsors
from charging a profit-making price for investigational drugs for
treatment use. 94 Like any corporation, the profit-motive dictates the
conduct of pharmaceutical companies. Only allowing these companies to recover the costs of making investigational drugs available
outside of a clinical trial does not even constitute compensation for
total expenses, because it excludes opportunity costs associated with
time, effort and inconvenience.
FDA regulations also create disincentives to making investigational drugs available outside of clinical trials for reasons related to
the collection of data for marketing approval. The FDA has not tradi91 See 21 C.F.R. 312.34(a), 312.34(b)(3).
92

See Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees, supra note 87, at 14 (stat-

ing that the FDA approves most of the single-patient Treatment ND requests submitted); Huntington's Disease Drug Works et al., A Written Comment Submitted to the
FDA (2007), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/06nOO62/06n-0062EC27-Attach-l.pdf (stating that lack of industry support is by far the most significant
problem for expanded access programs); Jeff Ryan, Advocates for Patient Rights
Want 'InitialApproval' for Unproven Drugs, APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALs, May 1,
2004, (interviewing Frank Burroughs, founder of the Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs, who states that the Treatment IND program has not
worked because of regulatory disincentives and a lack of reasonable economic incentives).
93 See Beryl Lieff Benderly, Experimental Drugs on Trial, Sci. AM., Oct.
2007, at 93, 95-96 (quoting Scott Gottlieb, a former FDA deputy commissioner for
medical and scientific affairs, for the proposition that "[tihe biggest impediment [to
early access to investigational drugs outside of trials] is the unwillingness of some
companies to offer the drug.") (second alteration in original); Annas, supra note 20, at
411 (claiming that the FDA's proposed regulations of investigational drugs will do
little to increase access because manufacturers have no incentives to make their investigational products available outside clinical trials).
94 See, e.g., Vital Therapies, A Written Comment Submitted to the FDA (Jan.
30,
2007),
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/06nOO62/06n-0062c000005-01-voll.pdf (stating that the FDA's proposed regulations on charging for
investigational drugs are restrictive because they do not provide a financial incentive
to make investigational drugs available); Huntington's Disease Drug Works et al.,
supra note 92 (suggesting that the FDA can address the problem of limited access to
investigational drugs by offering financial incentives to industry companies); Complaint, supra note 1, at 6 (suggesting that compassionate use programs are too small
because drug sponsors may not charge more than a cost recovery amount to participants).

2009]

EXPANDING ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS

219

tionally allowed efficacy information gained from expanded access
protocols to be included as evidence in a New Drug Application.9 5 In
this respect, data from expanded access protocols does not support the
goal of market approval and cannot benefit the company. Moreover,
anecdotal evidence associated with an adverse reaction to an investigational drug in an uncontrolled setting might raise safety concerns
that could hinder market approval or create adverse publicity. 96 Thus,
drug companies may bear costs associated with negative outcomes in
an expanded access setting, while they cannot benefit from positive
outcomes.
Liability concerns are additional disincentive to participating in
expanded access programs. According to Eli Lilly, one of the world's
largest pharmaceutical companies, FDA approval of an expanded
access protocol does not remove investigator and sponsor liability for
an adverse event as a concern.97 Indeed, pharmaceutical companies
could be held liable for injuries in this context based on theories of
strict products liability, failure to warn, negligence, or fraud. 98 Although FDA regulations do not create concerns over liability, they do
not offer any protection against it. Regardless of whether this is good
policy, the prospect of getting sued creates an additional disincentive
to making investigational drugs available for treatment use.
Physicians also face disincentives and obstacles to obtaining
investigational drugs in order to treat their patients. Many physicians
find the administrative hassle and time commitment associated with
requesting these drugs so burdensome that they do not even attempt to
obtain them. 99 While this may sound callous, for most physicians,
95 GLAXOSMITHKLINE, RE: DOCKET No.

2006N-002 (R!N 0910-AFI4): COM-

MENTS ON THE PROPOSED RULE ON "EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
FOR TREATMENT USE" (FEDERAL REGISTER 71: 75147-75168, DECEMBER 14, 2006)

(2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/06nOO62/06N0062-EC87-Attach-1 .pdf.
96 Groopman, supra note 14, at 7; Currie, supra note 81, at 322-323.

97 ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE:
PROPOSED RULE: EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT

DOCKET No. 2006N-0062 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/06nOO62/06N-0062-EC53-Attach-l.pdf. See also Groopman, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that drug companies are reluctant to supply experimental drugs outside of a clinical trial in part because of the fear that patients who
suffer adverse reactions will sue the company).
98 Meghan K. Talbott, The Implications of Expanding Access to Unapproved
Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316, 318 (2007).
99Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, supra note 11. See also
Ellen Stovall et al., A Written Comment Submitted to the FDA (Mar. 14, 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/06nOO62/06N-0062-EC9 1-Attach1.pdf ("many physicians find the process of applying for individual access to be unUSE:
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practicing in the current high-demand environment is impossible
without rationing time and responsibilities to a certain extent. I0 Adding to the problem, many physicians simply are not aware of the existence of investigational drugs that could benefit their patients. 1 1 Although Congress mandated registry of all clinical trials relevant to
serious or life threatening diseases on the public database ClinicalTrials.gov in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997,102 there
are no enforcement mechanisms and lack of compliance
10 3
is evident.
In light of these obstacles and disincentives, it may seem surprising that access to investigational drugs outside of clinical trials does in
fact occur.' 4 The most plausible explanation for this is that drug
companies have an incentive to promote a positive reputation among
physicians and other health care providers.' 0 5 Physicians tend to respond favorably to drug companies that appear to have patient best
interests in mind by participating in indigent drug programs or expanded access protocols. 10 6 Ultimately, drug companies hope that this
positive image will affect physicians' prescription patterns and translate to revenue for the company. Some companies may determine that
these potential revenues offset any costs or lack of benefit associated
with making their investigational drugs available for treatment use.
However, many drug companies know which physicians have the
greatest influence within the medical community. 10 7 The incentive to
promote a positive image may only be strong enough to induce companies to expand access in the relatively rare transactions involving
these influential physicians.108 Undoubtedly, access to investigational
drugs for treatment use has been concentrated in academic medical
settings in part because influencing a prominent teacher has an even
greater potential multiplier effect.' 0 9 Thus, despite the incentive to
duly burdensome"); Huntington's Disease Drug Works et al., supra note 92 ("the
process [of obtaining an investigational drug for a desiring patient] remains so labor
intensive that very few individual physicians can afford the time and expense").
100 Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, supra note 11.
101Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, supra note 11.
112 See Jennifer L. Gold & David M. Studdert, Clinical Trials Registries:
A
Reform that Is PastDue, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 811,815 (2005).
103 Id. at 816.
104There is no helpful data indicating how often such access occurs.
105Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, supra note 11.
106 Id.
107 Id.
Id.
109See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed.
108

Reg. 75147, 75149 (Dec. 14, 2006) (expressing concern over claim that patients
treated outside of academic medical centers are less likely to have access to investiga-
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influence physicians, FDA regulations in collaboration with industry
disincentives still almost certainly ensure that supply does not come
close to meeting the demand for investigational drugs. Ultimately,
whether Congress should require the FDA to relax these restrictions
on access depends on the soundness of the policy justifications supporting them.
IV. THE POLICY BEHIND REGULATING
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT USE
Determining whether Congress should direct the FDA to reform
its investigational drug regulations is a policy judgment involving the
balancing of competing interests. On. the one hand, seriously and terminally ill patients with no remaining approved treatment options
should be able to access potentially beneficial yet unapproved drugs.
On the other hand, restricting access to unapproved drugs furthers the
government's legitimate interest in protecting patients and promoting
public health. In this section and the following section I will argue
that FDA regulations do not strike the appropriate balance because
they unduly favor the latter interests at the expense of the former. I
will evaluate the primary governmental interests that justify restrictions on access to investigational drugs: protecting seriously and terminally ill patients from the consequences of their own decision to
take a potentially dangerous and unproven drug, promoting public
health by ensuring the efficiency and integrity of clinical trials, and
promoting public health by preventing the widening of health disparities." ° I will argue that an unacceptable form of strong paternalism
underlies FDA regulations in their role of restricting access to investigational drugs in order to protect patient best interests. I will also
argue that FDA regulations are overbroad and that Congress can relax
the strongly paternalistic restrictions on access to investigational drugs
without significantly jeopardizing patient safety or public health.

tional drugs for treatment use).
110In dividing my policy analysis into the government's interest in protecting

the best interests of patients on the one hand and promoting public health on the other
hand, I consider future patients under the rubric of public health. As already evident,
I devote my analysis of patient best interests in this section to the best interests of the
seriously and terminally ill patients with no approved treatment options who would be
eligible to take investigational drugs.
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A. Regulating Investigational Drugs to Protect Seriously and Terminally Ill Patients from Their Own Decisions
In some cases, the government has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from the harmful consequences of their own decisions,
even where these consequences fall primarily on the decision-maker.
Such protection is particularly justified in health care, where disease
often impairs consumer capacity, considerable informational asymmetries exist between provider and consumer, and decisions are often
crucial to well-being. For example, courts may grant physicians the
legal authority to disregard a patient's medical treatment decision and
force unwanted treatment where a physician determines that a patient
does not have the capacity to make the requisite decision. 1 This type
of legal interference with a personal decision is justified because incompetent individuals no longer tend to make decisions that promote
their best interests as determined by their own values. However,
assuming the decision is primarily self-regarding, or in other words
that any adverse effects of the decision do not fall substantially on
others,' 12 the government should not intervene to protect competent
patients from the consequences of their own medical treatment decisions. This conclusion assumes that competent patients make decisions that promote their own values, and thus intervening is not in
their best interests. The only alternative assumption is that the policies behind government intervention are more in accord with a competent patient's best interests than the patient's own values, which is
the assumption underlying strong paternalism. In a liberal society that
protects a plurality of the good such as the United States, regulations
that tend towards strong paternalism are rarely, if ever, good policy.
1. The Arguments for Justifying FDA Restrictions Based on the Best
Interests of Seriously and Terminally Ill Patients
In holding that FDA regulations are rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting terminally ill patients from being
harmed by unapproved drugs, the DC Circuit in Abigail Alliance appealed to patient best interests as a justification for the FDA's policies. 113 In its brief, the FDA echoed this justification, stating: "By
...
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 202A.196 (LexisNexis 2008) (establishing the conditions under which district courts can authorize forced treatment of the
mentally ill).
12 1 make this assumption for the purposes of this section because I address
the potential adverse effects on others of a decision to take an investigational drug in
Section IV:B, infra.
113 See Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach (Abigail I1), 495 F.3d 695, 713
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acting as a regulatory gatekeeper, the FDA increases the likelihood
that the use of an investigational drug will further the underlying
interests in4 life and health that the patient's choice is intended to
advance." 1
Indeed, there are primafacie plausible arguments for patient best
interests as a justification for the FDA's proscription of a market for
investigational drugs. As an initial matter, the dangers of investigational drugs indirectly support this justification. Especially in the
early phases of testing, investigational drugs are unsafe and ineffective relative to approved drugs."15 By hastening death or increasing
suffering, these relatively unsafe and ineffective drugs can harm even
the terminally ill. To be sure, even where risk is extremely high, interfering with a competent patient's substantially self-regarding medical treatment decision remains based in strong paternalism. After all,
competent patients in collaboration with their physicians are in a better position to determine their own aversion to risk and make their
own risk-benefit assessments than anyone else, including the FDA.
However, some bioethicists and clinicians have proposed models for
determining competence that account for risk levels, known as sliding-scale models of competence. 16 Under a sliding-scale model, the
level of evidence required to determine competence increases with the
risk associated with a particular decision. 1 7 These models accommodate the intuition that the importance of ensuring that an individual
possesses the requisite capacities increases with the magnitude and
risk of harm associated with a particular decision." 8 For example, it
seems reasonable to require more of evidence indicating competence
for a decision to refuse a simple but life-saving blood transfusion than
for a decision to accept the same transfusion. Thus, under a slidingscale model, deciding to take a relatively unsafe investigational drug
would impose a high evidentiary burden for competence on seriously
and terminally ill patients. The argument could proceed with the
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
114 Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees, supra note 87, at 23.
115 I further discuss the safety and effectiveness of investigational drugs in
Section IV:A:2, infra.
116 See e.g., THOMAS GRIsso & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE
TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT 139 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998); ALLEN E. BUCHANAN &
DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION

MAKING 51-70 (1990); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
t
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 74-77 (Oxford Univ. Press 5 ' ed. 2001). For discussion and

criticisms of sliding-scale models, see Mark R. Wicclair, The ContinuingDebate over
Risk-Related Standards ofCompetence, 13 BIOETHICS 149 (1999).
117BEAUCHAMP ET AL., supra note 116, at 76.
"' Id. at 75.
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claim that the decision to take one of these drugs made by a seriously
or terminally ill patient is not likely to meet this high evidentiary burden.
The primary basis for challenging competence in this context is
the prejudicial effect of serious or terminal illness on voluntariness.
Critics of expanded access claim that the desperation associated with
serious illness inhibits or prevents patients from accurately understanding or assessing the risks and benefits of a decision to take an
investigational drug.11 9 This conclusion is largely based on the notion
that desperate patients are particularly vulnerable to the unrealistic
belief that unproven treatment will benefit them, also known as the
therapeutic misconception. 120 In fact, bioethicist and law professor
George Annas has characterized the terminally ill as "the most vulnerable research subject," claiming that research rules should disqualify
all desperate patients from participating in research. 121 Furthermore,
some commentators appeal to the "coercive" influence of the therapeutic misconception on desperate patients, 122 which implies that
unrealistic hope narrows a patient's options to the123extent that he or she
is effectively forced to make a harmful decision.

119 See e.g., Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees, supra note 87, at 50

("[D]esperation...has the inescapable potential to prevent an accurate evaluation of
the risks and benefits of experimental drugs"); Caplan, supra note 20, at 2 ("Nor is it
clear that those who are terminally ill can make the requisite autonomous risk/benefit
decision to use a new drug... ").
120 See Caplan, supra note 20, at 2 ("The desire to hope for the best - what is
sometimes termed the therapeutic misconception - is often present on the part of
those facing death... "); Andrew F. Shorr, AIDS and the FDA: An Ethical Casefor
Limiting Patient Access to New Medical Therapies, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., JulyAug. 1992, at 1, 3 ("Patients desperately seeking cure who enter a study that offers
only hope ... are hardly capable of granting informed consent in a fully voluntary
manner.") (quoting Ruth Macklin & Gerald Friedland, AIDS Research: The Ethics of
Clinical Trials, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 273, 279 (1986)); Annas, supra note 20,
at 412 (stating that the Abigail Alliance court that held that there is a fundamental
right to certain investigational drugs seems to be suffering from a therapeutic illusion
in which research is confused with treatment).
121 George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation:
Nuremberg, Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 120, 135 (1992).
122 JESSICA W.

BERG ET AL.,

INFORMED CONSENT:

LEGAL THEORY AND

(2nd ed. 2001) ("Physicians should be aware of how vulnerable patients may be to the coercive influence of unrealistic hope, especially those
suffering from chronic, life-threatening disorders").
123 See Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Clarifying Confusions
about Coercion, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16, 17 (defining coercion as the unfavorable narrowing of a person's choices in order to get the person to do something he
would not otherwise do).
CLINICAL PRACTICE 68
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In addition, some critics of expanded access challenge competence in this context by arguing that it is difficult or impossible to
adequately inform patients about the risks and benefits of an investigational drug where so little data is available, especially in the early
phases of testing. 124 Typically, data from Phase I trials only pertains
to 20 to 80 subjects and to maximum tolerable dose and likely shortterm side effects. 125 This simply may not be enough information to
understand the consequences of a decision to take a drug early in the
testing process, and a decision made without understanding the consequences is not competent. In sum, if these threats to the competence
of a seriously or terminally ill patient's decision to take an investigational drug are legitimate and substantial, FDA restrictions are in
patients' best interests.
A separate set of considerations linking FDA restrictions to the
best interests of seriously and terminally ill patients specifically relates to the prospect of allowing drug companies to charge a. profitmaking price for investigational drugs. Namely, doing so puts them
in a position to exploit the desperation of these patients through price
gouging and manipulative marketing. 126 Price gouging occurs when a
seller takes advantage of an unusually high demand and lack of competition by charging excessively high prices. 127 Price gouging is especially worrisome in a critical healthcare context: desperate patients
facing death who have sufficient means may be willing to pay exorbitant prices for one last chance at curing or ameliorating their illness.
In addition, allowing profit creates incentive to advertise, and drug
marketers could undoubtedly devise subtle ways to capitalize on desperation through advertising. Prohibiting drug companies from profiting from investigational drugs ensures that neither of these practices
will occur and thereby protects the best interests of patients. 121

124

See Annas, supra note 20, at 412; Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach

(Abigail 1), 445 F.3d 470, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Griffith, J., dissenting) (quoting the
FDA), vacated, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
125 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2008). Increasingly, however, Phase I oncology
trials test for therapeutic benefit, usually as a secondary endpoint. Thomas G. Roberts
et al., Trends in the Risks and Benefits to Patients With Cancer Participatingin Phase
1 Clinical Trials, 292 JAMA 2130, 2131 (2004).
126 See Annas, supra note 121, at 132-133 (stating that pharmaceutical
companies can make money by exploiting fear of death and desperation).
127 See Michael Brewer, Note, PlanningDisaster:Price Gouging Statutes and
the Shortages They Create, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2007).
128 Because my response to these arguments comes in the form of recommendations for legislation, I defer it to Section V:A, infra.
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2. Responding to Arguments that Appeal to the Best Interests of
Seriously and Terminally Ill Patients
Upon closer examination, many of the concerns about the safety
and effectiveness of investigational drugs and the competence of a
decision to take them are overstated or misguided. Focusing on the
safety and effectiveness of investigational oncology treatments, for
years the most commonly cited figures indicated that Phase I trials of
anti-cancer drugs led to an overall response rate of about 5% and a
rate of death from toxic effects of 0.5% or lower.129 (Overall response
rate represents the sum of the complete response rate - a complete
disappearance of a tumor - and the partial response rate - a 50% or
greater reduction in the size of the tumor).130 Presumably, these are
some of the figures that the FDA would have used in assessing the
risks and benefits of investigational drugs to help design its Treatment
IND program in 1987. But in addition to being outdated, these figures
are misleading. Of the studies reporting these response rates, the latest available analysis reports on trials published from 1970-1987, failing to account for trials done with newer compounds13 1 or trials done
with a combination of agents.132 Newer compounds may lead to more
favorable response rates because researchers are increasingly able to
design drugs that target the root causes of disease. 133 Furthermore,
because all subjects must have progressive cancer to qualify for a
Phase I oncology trial, 134 the absence of data indicating less-thanpartial responses and stabilization of disease betrays the overall effect
of these trials. In other words, in order to present a complete perspective, studies involving patients whose cancer is growing or spreading
should account for less than 50% tumor shrinkage and lack of tumor
growth.
In light of these shortcomings, Horstmann et al. conducted a more
comprehensive study using data from 460 Phase I oncology trials
129

Elizabeth Horstmann et al., Risks and Benefits of Phase I Oncology Trials,

1991 through 2002, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 895, 901 (2005) (citing nine different
studies that support these figures); see also Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1075-76
(citing four different studies that support the data on response rate and one study that
supports the data on toxicity related death).
130 Horstmann et al., supra note 129, at 897.
131 Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1076.
132 Horstmann et al., supra note 129, at 896.
133 See Roberts et al., supra note 125, at 2130 (stating that the
risk-benefit
ratio of Phase I oncology trials may have improved in part because of the targeted and
less toxic nature of newer cancer drugs).
134 Razelle Kurzrock & Robert S. Benjamin, Risks and Benefits of Phase 1
Oncology Trials, Revisited, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 930, 930 (2005).
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involving 11,935 subjects between 1991 and 2002.135 The results
indicated an overall response rate of 10.6%, a stable disease or a lessthan partial response rate of 34.1%, and a toxicity related death rate of
.49%.136 Interpreting the results, 44.7% of subjects derived a physiological benefit in terms of tumor shrinkage or lack of growth from the
trials analyzed.137 Granted, these results do not necessarily reflect an
increase in quality of life because they do not indicate response duration, which refers to the length of time for which a drug reduces the
size of a tumor, and because they do not account for the impact of
potential side-effects. 138 But this study does provide important evidence that investigational oncology drugs are increasingly effective at
reducing or stabilizing tumors early in the testing process. 139 In fact,
the response rates observed in these Phase I oncology studies are not
clearly worse than response rates used by the FDA as a basis for
approval of certain cancer treatments. 140 For example, high-dose interleukin 2, the only FDA-approved treatment for metastatic renal cell
carcinoma, has a response rate of 14%.' a4 In addition, the FDA
approved topotecan for ovarian cancer, which has a 10% response
rate, and gemcitabine
for metastatic pancreatic cancer, which has a
142
5.4% response rate.
Moreover, in some cases response rates to investigational oncology treatments are extremely high. For example, a Phase I trial of
imatinib mesylate for chronic leukemia resulted in a 93% response
rate.1 43 In addition, monoclonal antibody IMC-C225, plus radiation
therapy, led to a complete response rate of 87% in patients with
locally advanced, inoperable head and neck cancers. 144 Where a
major subset of early-stage investigational drugs now demonstrate
135 Horstmann et al., supra note 129, at 898-99.

Id. at 895.
137 See Kurzrock et al., supra note 134, at 930.
138 The overall frequency, severity, and impact on quality of life of nausea,
136

vomiting, and other debilitating adverse effects from cancer treatments have been
poorly documented. Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1077.
139 Note that the data presented here applies to results from clinical trials.
Results from outside of a clinical trial setting would likely vary slightly due to differences between research and treatment settings in average patient condition and the
nature and level of care.
140 Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1077.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Kurzrock et al., supra note 134, at 931.
144 Am. Cancer Soc'y, Monoclonal Antibody Drug IMC-C225 Shows Wide
Promise, ACS NEWS CENTER, May 24, 2000, http://www.cancer.org/docroot/
NWS/content/NWS_1 lxMonoclonalAntibodyDrugIMCC225_ShowsWideP
romise.asp.
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response rates comparable to certain approved treatments, and occasional response rates well above many approved treatments, justifying
regulations that deny patients with no other options access to these
drugs by appealing to their own good begins to seem questionable.
Furthermore, average response rates to Phase II and Phase III drugs
can only be higher and as indicated, response rates to all investigational drugs will likely increase as researchers learn more about the
root causes of disease and develop drugs that target these root
causes. 145 The FDA has not significantly revised its expanded access
regulations in twenty-one years and should respond to these advancements in technology.
While these considerations primarily apply to effectiveness, there
is also reason to believe that investigational drugs are not exceedingly
unsafe for seriously or terminally ill patients with no approved treatment options. Investigational drugs are not quackery: in order for an
IND Application to receive approval, the FDA must assess data from
animal and in vitro studies and determine that it is "reasonably safe to
conduct the proposed clinical investigations" in a human population. 146 One study reported that the FDA ultimately approves only
11% of all drugs that enter into clinical testing. 47 However, even
though it is difficult to collect accurate data in this context because
researchers do not always disclose unfavorable data, 148 this figure
alone is misleading. Sponsors do not always abandon drugs for
safety-related reasons. For example, one study analyzed clinical trials
for all drugs from 1981-1992 and found that sponsor abandonment
occurred for safety reasons only 20.5% of the time.149 Lack of efficacy or50 economic concerns accounted for most instances of abandonment.
Perhaps more importantly, however, critics of expanded access
who appeal to the dangers of investigational drugs often fail to account for the significant difference between risk assessments applied
to the terminally ill and those applied to the average person. Terminally ill patients with no approved treatment options will likely die in
a matter of months without further intervention. Treatment that is
unreasonable for the average person may be quite reasonable where
"45
'46
147

See Roberts et al., supra note 125, at 2130.
See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2008).
Susan Okie, Access before Approval - A Right to Take Experimental

Drugs?, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 437, 439 (2006).
148
149

Id.
Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 206 (noting that this figure likely underesti-

mates safety concerns) (citations omitted).
Iso Id.
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imminent death is the alternative. 151 Indeed, risk-benefit assessments
and the reasonableness of treatment are largely subjective matters, and
some studies demonstrate that patients facing a serious illness make
very different assessments of the risks they are willing to confront
compared to healthy individuals. 15 For example, Slevin et al. found
that patients with cancer were willing to undergo intensive chemotherapy with substantial adverse effects for a 1% chance of cure, compared to members of the general public, who indicated that they would
require a 50% chance of cure to proceed with treatment in the same
situation. 153 A regulatory policy that fails to account for this diverse
set of preferences risks subordinating the welfare
of the seriously and
54
terminally ill to their healthier counterparts.
The Slevin et al. study supports the notion that the average person
believes that accepting death and transitioning to palliative care is the
most reasonable decision when facing slim odds of benefitting from
an investigational drug. But insofar as this decision reflects a judgment about the value of quality of life, it overlooks the compatibility
of focusing on quality of life through palliative care or symptom management and receiving treatment.155 More importantly, pursuing
treatment may actually improve quality of life regardless of its physical impact, and the risk-benefit assessment made by the average
healthy person may be based on values that certain seriously and terminally ill patients do not share. In the words of Professor George
Zimmer, a cancer victim and participant in several Phase I oncology
trials:
Letting a patient choose the poisons (under professional guidance) adds something to the will to struggle. We who are
struggling to escape cancer do not, obviously, want to die of
it.... The enemy is not pain or even death, which will come
for us in any eventuality. The enemy is cancer, and we want
it defeated and destroyed.... This is how I want to die - not a

151See Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1077 (stating that a slight chance of

therapeutic benefit is not unreasonable for patients in whom all standard therapeutic
interventions have failed).
152 See Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1078.
15' Id. at 1077-1078 (citing Maurice L. Slevin et al., Attitudes to Chemotherapy: Comparing Views of Patients with Cancer to Those of Doctors, Nurses, and
GeneralPublic 300 BRIT. MED. J. 1458 (1990)).
154 Michael D. Greenberg, Information, Paternalism,and Rational DecisionMaking: The Balance ofFDA New DrugApproval, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.663, 675
(2003).
155 Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1077.
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suicide 1and
not passively accepting, but eagerly in the
56
struggle.
The attitude expressed by Professor Zimmer supports the notion
that there may be non-physical benefits to a decision to take an investigational drug. Especially for seriously and terminally ill patients,
well-being goes beyond the mere absence of disease and includes psychological and social dimensions. 57 Data on the safety and effectiveness of investigational drugs fails to account for these non-physical
dimensions. 58 Patients often seek out Phase I trials, even if chances
of meaningful benefit are small, because their quality of life is improved by "not giving up."'159 Indeed, several studies have demonstrated that participating in Phase I oncology trials may improve
patients' quality of life compared to the alternative of receiving supportive care.
For example, Melink et al. used Linear Analogue
Self-Assessment (LASA), which is a self-reporting assessment tool
that measures quality of life, to compare the quality of life of cancer
patients who received a Phase I oncology treatment and cancer
patients who were not eligible for a Phase I trial and who received
supportive care. 61 The results indicated that, while patients who
received a Phase I oncology treatment did not report a significant
change in quality of life after one course of therapy, patients who
received supportive care reported a significant decrease in overall
quality of life after a one month follow up.162 In addition, Berdel et al.
used LASA to demonstrate that treatment with anticancer medication,
both in a Phase I trial and outside of a clinical trial, had a significant
positive influence on the psychological and social aspects of LASA,

156Christopher K. Daugherty et al., Learningfrom Our Patients: One Participant's Impact on Clinical Trial Research and Informed Consent 126 ANNALS

INTERNAL MED. 892 (1997). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at
14 ("Are the last days of a person's life better spent in painful struggle against nearly
impossible odds, but with some hope and the conviction that she is doing everything
possible? Or is it instead better or more noble to accept one's fate and spend the final
days saying goodbye and hoping passively for a spontaneous remission? The patient's interest in weighing those values for herself transcends any disagreement about
how to interpret the evidence from a particular clinical trial.").
157Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1076-77.
' Id.at 1077.
159Kurzrock et al., supra note 134, at 931.
160Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1077 (citing nine studies that demonstrate
this result).
161Teresa J. Melink et al., The Impact of Phase I Clinical Trials on the Quality ofLife of Patients with Cancer,3 ANTI-CANCER DRUGS 571, 571 (1992).
162Id. at 573-75.
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as indicated by feelings
of well-being, mood, level of activity, and
63
level of anxiety.'
Although these considerations weaken the argument that FDA
restrictions on access to investigational drugs protect the best interests
of patients, the issue ultimately depends on whether serious and terminal illness or lack of information significantly undermine competence. Again, competent patients in collaboration with their physicians should be free to assume as much or as little risk as they choose.
Some studies do present findings that correlate illness severity with
compromised competence. For example, Schaeffer et al. found that
illness severity had a negative effect on the amount of information
retained in an informed consent document. 64 The study also found
that even where the consent form indicated that the study was not designed for treatment, participants in Phase I trials enrolled primarily
for treatment purposes. 165 The study concluded that Phase I and II
subjects were more influenced by their own medical conditions, hope
for control of disease, and perceived lack of any other choice, than by
disclosed information. 66 Another study found that, although 90% of
patients with cancer who participated in research reported being satisfied with the informed consent process, few understood the potential
for incremental risk or discomfort from participating in research and
the uncertainty of the benefits. 167 Results of this nature, however, are
not uniform. For example, Casarett et al. used a Global Distress Index
(GDI), which correlates with levels of distress in cancer patients, and
found no relationship between GDI score and understanding of disclosed information or ability to 168
reason through the risks and benefits
of participating in a mock study.
More importantly, studies that appear to link illness severity with
diminished decision-making capacity often fail to differentiate between comprehension - understanding the factual components of the
information - and appreciation - what the information means to a

163 Wolfgang

E. Berdel et al., Influence of PhaseI Early ClinicalTrials on the

Quality ofLife of CancerPatients:A Pilot Study, 8 ANTICANCER RES. 313 (1988).
Monica Schaeffer et al., The Impact of Disease Severity on the Informed
ConsentProcess in ClinicalResearch, 100 AM. J. MED. 261,264 (1996).
161 Id. at 266.
166Id.
167 Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1078 (citing Steven Joffe et al., Quality of
Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A Cross-SectionalSurvey, 358 LANCET
1772).
168 David J. Casarett et al., Identifying Ambulatory CancerPatients at Risk of
Impaired Capacity to Consent to Research, 26 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 615, 61920 (2003).
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particular person. 169 Subjects may comprehend their limited chance
of personal benefit and still hope that they will benefit. 7 ° Indeed,
some studies indicate that subjects enrolled in Phase I trials hope that
they will benefit, but understand that this outcome is unlikely.' 7' For
example, Daugherty et al. found that possible therapeutic benefit
motivated 85% of subjects to participate in a Phase I trial, but that
78% were either unwilling or unable to state whether
they believed
72
that they would personally benefit from participating.
The distinction between comprehension and appreciation also
motivates a response to those who challenge competence based on the
relatively small amount of information available about investigational
drugs. Information is relevant to competence because of its effect on
understanding, and generally persons understand if they "have
acquired pertinent information and have justified, relevant beliefs
about the nature and consequences of their actions." 173 The small
amount of information available about a particular investigational
drug may lead a patient to justifiably believe that the consequences of
his or her decision to take the drug are not likely to be beneficial. But
where accepting a serious disability or palliative care and a quiet
death are inconsistent with the patient's values, deciding to take the
drug anyway may be a perfectly competent, value-promoting decision.
In other words, while the patient understands that the lack of information surrounding the drug makes benefit uncertain or unlikely, he or
she appreciates the situation such that even a small chance of benefit
is worth pursuing.
Furthermore, while many seriously or terminally ill patients may
feel compelled by their circumstances to pursue treatment with an
investigational drug, this compulsion is not coercion. 174 Coercion is a
form of manipulation in which an agent intentionally narrows a person's options in an attempt to force the person to decide in a way that
he or she would not otherwise decide. 75 For example, an armed thief
coerces a victim to give up his or her wallet by narrowing the victim's
options down to either giving up the wallet or getting shot. But when
nature or accident narrows someone's options rather than intentional

169

Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1079.

"7 Id. at 1080.

Kurzrock et al., supra note 134, at 931.
172 C. Daugherty et al., Perceptionsof Cancer Patients and Their Physicians
171

Involved in PhaseI Trials, 13 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1062 (1995).
173 Beauchamp et al., supra note 116, at 88.
174 Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1081.
175 See Hawkins et al., supra note 123, at 17.
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action, the person simply suffers from bad luck. 176 Thus, unless
someone contrives the situation, if a serious or terminal illness
deprives a patient of valuable options to the extent that pursuing unproven treatment seems like the most reasonable decision, coercion is
not an issue. Having few perceived options is entirely consistent with
voluntary decision-making. 177 If critics of expanded access are claiming that the illness only makes pursuing unproven treatment appearto
be the reasonable option when it is not actually so, then the problem is
that the patient does not accurately understand the risks and benefits,
which is a separate issue that does not involve coercion. Alternatively, the critic appreciates the situation differently and is implicitly
making an unwarranted value judgment:
Claims of coercion [as a result of serious illness] may be projections rather than empirically substantiated facts. They
arise from the view that any clearly thinking person would desire palliative care and being at home with family rather than
aggressive chemotherapy at the end of life. But many dying
people want chemotherapy, even if there is a very low chance
of benefit and a reasonable chance of toxic effects, because it
offers them hope or fits their life narrative to fight against the
odds and to overcome challenges; to die without trying
every178
thing would be false to themselves and their values.
Indeed, citing the negative effects of serious and terminal illness
on decision-making capacity results in a tension with the current practice of allowing seriously and terminally ill patients to participate in
early-development drug research. 179 While the government requires
researchers to protect all of their competent subjects by obtaining
informed consent, it does not mandate any additional protection for
the seriously and terminally ill, and the seriously and terminally ill are
not listed as a vulnerable population by the Department
of Health and
0
Human Services in the Code of Federal Regulations.18
Finally, the gatekeeping role of the medical profession further
undermines the argument that FDA restrictions on access to investigational drugs are necessary to protect the best interests of seriously and
176

See id. (stating that coercion requires the intentional limiting of a persons

options in an attempt to manipulate her).
177 Agrawal et al., supra note 12, at 1081.
178 Id.
179 See Robertson, supra note 20, at 17.
180 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(3) (2008) (listing children, prisoners, pregnant
women, mentally disabled persons, and economically or educationally disadvantaged
persons as vulnerable populations).
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terminally ill patients. Patients will of course only be able to obtain
these drugs in consultation with their physician, and physicians have a
professional obligation not to pursue treatment that they believe will
harm their patient. In fact, with personal and direct knowledge of the
patient's condition and circumstances, physicians may be in a better
position to assess the risks to the patient posed by an investigational
drug than the FDA. With the medical profession already in place as a
mediator and safety valve situated between patients and investigational drugs, the FDA's role as protector of patients in this context
risks becoming overprotective. When also considering that investigational drugs are increasingly effective and not exceedingly unsafe for
seriously and terminally ill patients with no approved treatment options and that challenges to the competence of a seriously or terminally ill patient's decision to take an unapproved drug are overstated
or flawed, justifying the FDA's restrictions on access by appealing to
the best interests of seriously and terminally ill patients begins to
resemble strong paternalism.
B. Regulating Investigational Drugs to Promote Public Health
The primary public health objection to expanding access to investigational drugs stems from the public health benefit received from
efficient clinical trials and the potential for expanded access to
undermine these trials. A fast, effective system of clinical trials ensures that beneficial drugs reach the public as quickly as possible and
that harmful drugs never reach the public. Expanded access threatens
to undermine clinical trials in two ways. First, as the HDC-ABMT
case illustrates, 181 providing investigational drugs for treatment use
can negatively affect trial enrollment because patients have little
incentive to enroll in a trial in which they may receive a placebo when
they can obtain investigational drugs in a treatment setting.8 2 In turn,
prolonged clinical trials delay the benefits of safe and effective drugs
to future patients and the public. The second way in which expanded
access may undermine clinical trials relates specifically to the prospect of allowing drug companies to charge a profit-making price for
investigational drugs. Namely, doing so could reduce the incentive to
complete the rigorous clinical trial process by making it more attractive to sell unapproved drugs than to diligently pursue full market

181
182

See supra Section I (describing the HDC-ABMT case).
See Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees, supra note 87, at 11;

Jacobsen, supra note 20, at 206-07; Okie, supra note 147, at 437; Benderly, supra
note 93, at 4.
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approval. 183 The resulting delays in clinical trials would ultimately
harm the public.
Furthermore, allowing drug companies to charge a profit-making
price for investigational drugs could have the additional negative
effect on public health of widening existing health disparities. Both
public and private health insurance would almost certainly not cover
the vast majority of investigational drugs. Insurance plans exclude
"experimental" or "investigational" treatments in a variety of ways. 184
Some policies leave the determination up to the plan administrator,
while others exclude treatments under "clinical investigation," treatments "not generally recognized by the medical profession as tested
and accepted medical practice," or treatments "still requiring future
approval by the Federal Drug Administration or other governmental
agency."' 185 These exclusionary clauses are often desirable from the
standpoint of economic utility and cost containment. 86 Plan administrators have a limited amount of funds to provide for the medical
needs of plan members, and resources should arguably only be used to
pay for treatments proven to be safe and effective. 87 Although increasing premiums to cover costs is an option, the increase required to
begin covering investigational drugs would likely make health insurance unaffordable for some and an undue burden for many others.
Thus, insurance would not and should not cover the majority of investigational drugs, which would force patients to pay for these drugs
out-of-pocket. Because many patients in need would likely be unable
to afford these drugs, the unjust and already wide health disparities
between the rich and the poor' 88 may widen further as a result.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the public health benefits of maintaining the integrity of clinical trials largely do not apply
to patients who are currently terminally ill and who have no approved
treatment options. Because the clinical trials process takes an average

183 Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees, supra note 87, at 11, 15, 57.
184 Sharona Hoffman, A Proposalfor FederalLegislation to Address Health
Insurance Coveragefor Experimental andInvestigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV.
203, 208 (1999).
185Id. (citations omitted).
186 See id at 210.
187 Id. at210-11.
188 See e.g., U.S.
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http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf (indicating that the likelihood of
lacking health insurance increases with declining income, with 24.2% of people with
a yearly income less than $25,000 being uninsured in 2006, compared to 7.7% of
people with a yearly income of $75,000 or more).
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of seven years to complete,' 89 these patients likely will not live long
enough to experience the benefits of clinical trials. If FDA regulations are indeed strongly paternalistic towards the terminally ill, then
the public health benefits of FDA restrictions on access burden this
population in order to benefit the public. Although such utilitarian
based public health policies are commendable in certain cases,' 90 if
there is any way to reduce the burden on the negatively affected population without jeopardizing public health, policymakers should take
these steps. Otherwise, the regulations are overbroad. Because policymakers can create more tailored legislation that eases the restrictions on access to investigational drugs without significantly jeopardizing public health, my responses to the public health objections to
expanding access are also the basis of my recommendations for legislation.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION
A. Allow Drug Sponsors to Conditionally Charge a Profit-Making
Price for Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use
Most significantly, Congress should amend the FDCA to require
the FDA to allow IND sponsors to charge a profit-making price for
investigational drugs for treatment use. 191 Doing so would remove the
most substantial disincentive to industry participation in expanded
access programs. This ability to profit, however, should be conditioned on three qualifications. First, recognizing that allowing profit
could put drug companies in a position to exploit the seriously and
terminally ill, legislation should prohibit price gouging in the context
of expanded access programs. 192 Most states prohibit all industries
from engaging in price gouging during a state of emergency. 193 Insofar as a serious or terminal illness is an individual emergency, Con189
190

Groopman, supra note 14, at 2.
E.g. requiring the involuntary quarantine of anyone with a highly conta-

gious and serious disease.
191The FDA should retain the authority to prohibit IND sponsors from charging a profit-making price for investigational drugs in a clinical trial setting.
192 See Section IV.A.I for a description of price gouging ("[p]rice gouging
occurs when a seller takes advantage of an unusually high demand and lack of competition by charging excessively high prices.").
193 See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Prescription Drug Safety:
Emergency Controls, Scams and Long-Distance Sales, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/health/Rxemerg.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) (quoting the provisions of
laws from twenty-five different states that prohibit price gouging during an emergency).
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gress, by analogy, should apply similar provisions at the federal level
to drug companies selling investigational drugs. For example, Congress could prohibit drug companies from charging a price for an
investigational drug that is more than 20% above the market price of a
reasonably comparable approved drug. Second, legislation should
prevent exploitation of the seriously and terminally ill by restricting
the marketing of investigational drugs more than the marketing of
prescription drugs. Congress should prohibit direct-to-consumer
advertising of investigational drugs and require the FDA to establish
stringent guidelines for advertisements directed towards physicians.
Third, in order to counteract the risk that profiting from investigational drugs will delay marketing approval, profit should be conditional on evidence that the drug sponsor is continuing to diligently
pursue clinical trials. Legislation should leave the task of how to
accomplish this up to the FDA, which has expertise in the area of drug
regulation. The FDA should use its delegated authority to set forth
specific requirements to ensure that companies that profit in this context continue to diligently pursue clinical trials for the investigational
drug being sold. For example, the FDA could require sponsors who
wish to sell investigational drugs for profit to submit a copy of their
general investigational plan, including a development timeline and
enrollment estimates. 94 The FDA could then periodically monitor
progress to ensure that actual development and enrollment estimates
are not significantly behind or less than the original projections.1 95 If
development appears delayed, the FDA could require a compelling
justification for the delay. If the sponsor does not provide a compelling justification, the FDA could temporarily or permanently
revoke
96
the drug's IND status under its existing authority. 1
One objection to conditionally allowing drug sponsors to profit
from investigational drugs is that doing so is susceptible to abuse considering the difficulty and the monitoring burdens associated with
ensuring that sponsors do not delay marketing approval. Indeed, a
rule that outright prohibits sponsors from charging a profit-making
price might be reasonable if delaying or abandoning attempts at full
market approval in favor of selling investigational drugs were a viable
business model. However, there are substantial financial and logistical concerns that militate against widespread industry participation in
194 See Nat'l Patient Advocate Found., A Written Comment Submitted to the
FDA (Mar. 14, 2007),http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/O6nOO62/06n0062-EC90-Attach- 1.pdf.
195 See id.
196 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.44 (2008) (describing the conditions under which the
FDA may terminate an IND).

HEALTH M TRIX

[Vol. 19:205

a post-Phase I market. 197 For example, the market for investigational
drugs would be relatively small: seriously and terminally ill patients
who have exhausted all approved treatment options. 98 More importantly, drug companies often have a very limited drug supply early in
development. 99 Where there is little evidence that an investigational
drug will be safe and effective and therefore valuable on the full market, the incentive to undertake the substantial investment needed to
produce larger quantities
of drugs in the early stages of development
200
exist.
not
may
simply
In turn, this conclusion supports three further conclusions: allowing drug companies to charge a profit-making price for investigational
drugs 1) will not substantially expand access early in the testing process; 2) will not significantly harm the public by removing the incentive to pursue clinical trials; 3) will be more likely to prompt drug
manufacturers to produce larger quantities of investigational drugs
and expand access where results from early clinical trials are promising. Although the first conclusion in part undermines the purpose of
allowing drug companies to profit in this context, the second conclusion illustrates that prohibiting these profits is an unnecessary disincentive that burdens the few patients who would otherwise obtain
access early in the testing process. Moreover, the third conclusion
means that patients will be more likely to obtain access to beneficial
investigational drugs and less likely to obtain access to harmful investigational drugs. More specifically, the profit motive may only induce
drug sponsors to produce enough drugs to expand access where the
sponsor calculates that the drug is likely to receive full market
approval because of favorable early test results. The drugs that are
more likely to receive market approval are also more likely to be safe
and effective. Essentially, along with the medical profession, the
market would act as a mediator and safety valve situated between
patients and investigational drugs. Thus, conditioning a drug sponCurrie, supra note 81, at 322.
198 The requirement that eligible patients be unable to enter into a clinical
197

trial, discussed in Section V:B, infra, would reduce the size of this market even further.
199 Currie, supra note 81, at 322.
200 See id. (stating that the economies of scale needed to prompt manufacturers to produce larger quantities of drugs may not exist in the early stages of development); Robertson, supra note 20, at 17 (stating that selling drugs outside Phase II
trials would not be a viable business model for most companies); Groopman, supra
note 14, at 6 (quoting Richard Merrill, a professor at the University of Virginia Law
School and a prominent expert on drug regulation, for the proposition that the right
sought by the Abigail Alliance in Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach would require a
major investment to scale up production).
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sor's ability to profit from investigational drugs on requirements not
to neglect full market approval, engage in price gouging, or use
manipulative marketing techniques is a feasible way to expand access
without harming patients or jeopardizing public health.
B. Prohibit Patients Who Can Enter into a Clinical Trial
from Obtaining the Requested Investigational Drug
Congress should also amend the FDCA to prohibit patients who
are able to enter into a clinical trial for the requested investigational
drug from obtaining it for treatment use.2"' This will ensure that providing investigational drugs for treatment use does not delay the clinical trial process by diverting potential trial participants. If a patient
does not qualify for a particular trial because of the nature of his or
her condition or treatment history, because the trial is already full, or
because the location of the trial makes participation impractical, allowing the patient to access the investigational drug being tested will
not significantly threaten clinical trial enrollment and thus will do
little to undermine the testing process. Again, Congress should rely
on the FDA's discretion regarding how to implement this requirement.
For example, the FDA could review its clinical trial database to ensure
that patients seeking investigational drugs cannot qualify for a clinical
trial for the requested drug or a clinical trial is not geographically accessible. If the patient were unable to enter into a clinical trial, the
FDA would not intervene in the transaction between the drug company and the patient. If the patient were able to enter into a clinical
trial, the FDA would prohibit the transaction and inform the patient's
physician of the available trial. Delegating the responsibility of reviewing available clinical trials to the FDA rather than the physician
will prevent physicians from encountering an additional administrative burden in the expanded access process. In addition, the FDA may
have access to information about clinical trials that physicians and the
public do not. 2
Requiring seriously and terminally ill patients without approved treatment
options who are seeking an investigational drug for treatment use to enter into a randomized clinical trial where they may receive a placebo potentially raises ethical
concerns. Addressing these concerns, including the scientific value of placebo controls in comparison to alternatives such as historical controls, is beyond the scope of
this paper.
202 See Statement by Richard Pazdur, MD., Director,Division of Oncology
Drug Products, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human
th
Services Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 106 Cong. (2000), available
that
strict rules of confidenat http://www.fda.gov/ola/2000/cancerdrugs.html (stating
tiality bind the FDA concerning the information it can disclose to a physician about
201
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C. Encourage Drug Companies to Allocate Promising
Investigational Drugs to Indigent Drug Programs
Recognizing that regulations that allow drug companies to profit
from investigational drugs could increase health disparities due to lack
of insurance coverage, legislation should encourage drug sponsors to
start allocating a certain amount of their more promising investigational drugs to indigent drug programs. Many drug companies pay to
provide a fixed amount of certain approved drugs to indigent patients
in the hope that the resulting improved image will ultimately influence
prescription patterns.2 °3 Company representatives undoubtedly limit
the supply of drugs in these programs to ensure that the costs are more
than covered by cost-shifting and the profits from selling drugs to able
204 If drug companies offered some of their more promising
payers. 20
investigational drugs through these programs, patients who are below
a certain poverty level and who otherwise meet all of the expanded
access requirements could obtain these drugs. Although simply
encouraging drug companies to participate may seem like an empty
provision, highlighting awareness of the issue could help create an
environment in which drug companies have a greater self-promotion
incentive to finance the treatment use of certain investigational drugs.
Admittedly, this proposal may seem like a step back towards the
original problem created by prohibiting drug companies from profiting in this context. However, allowing companies to profit from those
who can afford investigational drugs may make companies more willing to finance limited access for those who cannot afford these drugs.
But this may not be a satisfactory response to the problem of widening health disparities. First, it is simply weak: encouraging drug
companies to provide free drugs is far from an assurance that they will
do so. Second, the indigent are not likely to be well educated and thus
are more likely to be ill equipped to understand the risks of investigational drugs. Adding to the problem, the indigent typically have
less access to health care,2 °5 so that providing them with investigational drugs outside of a controlled clinical trial environment could
create significant safety and monitoring concerns. When it comes to
the sponsor's product and development data).
203

Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, supra note 11.

See also

supra Section IV.A (describing the self-promotion incentive to participate in expanded access programs).
204 Telephone Interview with Michael Winniford, supra note 11.
205 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 188, at 21 (indicating that persons
with lower income are less likely to be covered by health insurance than persons with
higher income).
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indigent patients, the medical profession may not be a reliable mediator between patients and investigational drugs.
Although there is no perfect response to the risks created by providing investigational drugs to the indigent, the market may once
again mitigate some of the risk. To ensure that the maximum amount
of physicians are aware of drug companies providing free drugs, companies typically only allocate high-demand drugs to their indigent
drug programs. 206 While there are exceptions to every rule, highdemand drugs tend to be relatively safe and effective drugs. Thus, the
investigational drugs provided to indigent patients would likely be
safe and effective compared to other investigational drugs. At the
very least, this mitigates some of the safety concerns related to providing these drugs to indigent patients.
There are two responses to the claim that encouraging drug companies to allocate investigational drugs to their indigent drug programs is too weak as a solution to the problem created by increased
health disparities. First, any increase in health disparities would likely
be small, corresponding to the relatively small market for investigational drugs: terminally and seriously ill patients with no FDA
approved treatment options. Requiring that eligible patients be unable
to enter into a clinical trial would reduce the size of this market even
further. Second, the entire objection relating to inequitable access
assumes that widening health disparities as a result of increasing the
supply of a potential medical benefit is unacceptable policy. Alternatively, some might argue that the fewer who are unjustly denied a
potential medical benefit the better. According to this argument,
expanding access is better than not doing so, even where the resulting
access is inequitable. This argument is especially plausible in the
context of medical treatments, such as investigational drugs, as
opposed to enhancements, such as cosmetic surgery. As regrettable as
the situation is, many would not accept the notion that the relatively
well-off should not have access to potentially life-saving or lifeextending treatments solely because some patients cannot afford these
treatments. In any event, even for those who do accept this notion,
encouraging drug companies to provide promising investigational
drugs in their indigent drug programs could help reduce the relatively
small increase in health disparities that would result from allowing
companies to profit.

206

id.
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D. Reduce Disincentives Related to Liability,
Data Collection and Administrative Burdens
Finally, legislation should contain provisions that reduce the disincentives to providing investigational drugs for treatment use related
to liability, data collection, and the administrative burden on physicians. 207 Insofar as informed consent is not sufficient legal protection, 208 Congress should explicitly permit patients who meet the criteria for an expanded access protocol to waive their right to sue drug
sponsors for an adverse outcome caused by an investigational drug.
State governments already allow similar waivers in other contexts.
For example, in Ohio, proprietors of potentially dangerous recreational activities such as auto racing and horseback riding can require
participants to waive the proprietor's liability for negligent conduct,
but not wanton or willful misconduct. 20 9 Similarly, Congress should
permit patients to waive drug sponsors liability for negligence for an
adverse outcome caused by an investigational drug, but not for intentional misconduct. This is a fair way to allow patients to assume the
risk of engaging in a relatively unsafe practice and to remove a disincentive to sponsors providing access at the same time. In many cases,
the knowledge that waiving this right will increase a sponsor's willingness to cooperate will lead the patient to sign a waiver. But in the
interest of preserving patient autonomy, even if nominal in some
cases, legislation should not require this waiver.
Regarding disincentives related to data collection, legislation
should require the FDA to account for safety and efficacy information
from expanded access protocols when patients are within the scope of
the intended use of the drug. 210 While not as reliable as data from
controlled studies, knowing that a drug helps the kinds of severely ill
patients who are generally excluded from clinical trials could enable a
sponsor to obtain broader FDA approval and substantially increase
revenues. 211 Congress should leave the decision how to specifically
incorporate this data into a New Drug Application to the FDA's discretion.
Lastly, Congress should attempt to ease some of the administrative burdens on physicians by making the clinical trials process as
207

See supra Section III.B (describing the disincentives to making investiga-

tional drugs available for treatment use).
208 See Talbott, supra note 98, at 318.
209 Bishop v. Nelson Ledges Quarry Park, No. 2004-P-0008, 2005 WL
1272299, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27, 2005) (citations omitted).
210 GLAXoSMITHKLINE, supra note 95.
211 See Groopman, supra note 14, at 7.
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transparent and accessible as possible. Policymakers should pass legislation such as the Fair Access to Clinical Trails Act of 2007 (FACT
Act),21 2 or incorporate its provisions into new legislation. The FACT
Act, which is currently before the 110 th Congress, 2 13 mandates registration of all clinical trials conducted in the United States on ClinicalTrials.gov, requires investigators to report details such as research
outcomes, significant adverse events, and FDA approval status, and
establishes enforcement mechanisms such as financial penalties and
preclusion from Institutional Review Board approval for failure to
comply. 21 4 By consolidating clinical trial information into a single

accessible and convenient source and establishing enforcement
mechanisms, the FACT Act would make it easier for physicians to
find and research appropriate investigational2 15drugs for their patients
and to request information from the sponsor.
E. Summary of Recommendations
Implementing these recommendations will eliminate the elements
of strong paternalism in the current regulations by easing restrictions
on access to investigational drugs and will do so without significantly
jeopardizing patient safety or public health. Allowing drug sponsors
to charge a profit-making price for investigational drugs will remove a
substantial disincentive to access that afflicts the current system.
Conditioning this ability to profit on requirements not to neglect full
market approval, engage in price gouging, or use manipulative marketing techniques will protect patients from exploitation and ensure
that the public receives the full benefits of clinical trials. Prohibiting
patients who are able to enter into a clinical trial from obtaining the
relevant investigational drug for treatment use will ensure that
expanding access does not delay the clinical trial process by diverting
potential trial participants. Taking these steps while encouraging drug
companies to allocate promising investigational drugs to their indigent
drug programs will help reduce the relatively small increase in health
disparities that may result from allowing profit in this context.
212 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act of 2007, S. 467, 1 l0 th Cong. (2007).
213 See id.

214 Gold & Studdert, supra note 102, at 816.
215 Under the current system, there is substantial evidence that researchers
often do not submit studies with poor outcomes for publication, which skews systematic clinical trial reviews and meta-analyses that clinicians and policymakers use to
guide health care policy. Id. Requiring researchers to publish data from all clinical
trials has the additional benefit of helping to eliminate this "positive publication bias."
Id. at 812.
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Finally, removing disincentives to industry involvement in expanded
access programs related to drug sponsor liability, data collection, and
administrative burdens on physicians will further expand access without significantly compromising patient safety or public health.

VI. THE ACCESS ACT
In limited respects, the Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for
Seriously Ill Patients Act (ACCESS Act) approximates the ideal for
regulating investigational drugs for treatment use. 216 Republican Sam
Brownback introduced the ACCESS Act into the Senate in November
2005217 and reintroduced it in May 2008,218 while Republican Christopher Shays introduced it into the House of Representatives in October
20062 19 and Democrat Diane Watson reintroduced it in June 2008.220
Although the bill died in committee on every occasion, it is worth
evaluating due to its apparent ability to resurface as the congressional
standard for expanded access legislation.22 '
The ACCESS Act establishes a three-tiered approval mechanism
for new drugs that coexists with the current FDA framework for drug
approval.2 22 Tier I approval means that drugs are no longer fully
"investigational," but "approved" for sale on a restricted market, profits included.22 3 In order to receive Tier I approval, sponsors must
216

See Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S.

1956, 1090 Cong. (2005).
217 ACCESS Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1956 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
2 ACCESS Act, S. 3046, 110'h Cong. (2008), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-3046 (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
219 ACCESS Act, H.R. 6303, 109th Cong. (2006), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-6303 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
220 ACCESS Act, H.R. 6270, 1 10h Cong. (2008), http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-6270 (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
221 The ACCESS Act as reintroduced in the 110' Congress was similar, but
not identical to the ACCESS Act as introduced in the 1091 Congress. See Kurt Karst,
ACCESS Act Reintroduced by Sen. Brownback; Previous TieredApproval Nomenclature Scrapped and New Immunity Provision Added, FDA Law Blog, June 4, 2008,
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda-law bloghyman_phelps/2008/06/access-actrein.html. Because of the time at which this note was written, I only address the
version introduced in the 109' Congress.
222 See Groopman, supra note 14, at 5.
223 See Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act, S.
1956, 109 th Cong. § 5(h)(3) (2005) (referring to Tier I approval for marketing); id at
§ 5(f) (directing the FDA to establish a new expanded access program for investigational drugs apart from the tiered approval program, which indicates that tiered approval is a form of market approval). See also Ryan, supra note 92 (interviewing
Frank Burroughs, founder of the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs, who juxtaposes the Abigail Alliance's Tier I approval proposal, the predeces-
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submit an application to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
containing: 1) data from Phase I clinical trials, 2) evidence based on
data such as case histories, data from animal and computer models,
information about the pharmacological mechanism of action, or comparison with historical data, and 3) an assurance that the sponsor will
continue clinical investigation to obtain full market approval.224 The
Secretary must approve the application if the risk of the disease outweighs the risk of the drug for a patient subpopulation, and the drug
may benefit patients in this subpopulation.22 5
In addition, the bill requires the labels on Tier I drugs to state that
1) the drug is intended for use by a patient whose physician has
documented that the patient has exhausted all approved treatment
options; 2) the drug is intended for use by a patient whose physician
has documented that the patient "unsuccessfully sought treatment, or
obtained treatment that was not effective, with an investigational drug,
biological product, or device for which such individual is a reasonable
candidate"; 3) every patient who receives the drug shall provide a
waiver of the right to sue the drug sponsor or the prescribing physician; and 4) every patient who receives the drug shall allow the sponsor to obtain data about the patient that may be used to support Tier II
or III approval.226
Although the ACCESS Act takes a commendable step towards
expanding access, it contains some significant flaws. For instance, the
requirements that an eligible patient must have exhausted approved
treatment options and unsuccessfully sought treatment with an investigational drug are simply labeling requirements with no meaningful
enforcement mechanisms.2 27 By contrast, under the current expanded
access system, the FDA verifies that the patient meets the necessary
requirements before allowing a transaction between an investigational
drug sponsor and a patient to occur. 228 In part, this difference exists
because the ACCESS Act approves drugs for an entire market rather
than for individual patients or groups of patients as occurs under the
current system. The market would only be restricted insofar as
patients and physicians complied with certain labeling requirements.
While this would undoubtedly reduce administrative burdens and time
sor to the ACCESS Act, to the current Treatment IND system by stating that Tier 1
allows drug companies to "charge" for the drug, rather than merely recovering costs
under a Treatment IND).
224 S. 1956 § 3(a)-(b).
225 See id. at § 3(b)(4).
226 Id. at § 3(b)(5).
227 See id.
228 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a)-(c) (2008).
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delays, it is also susceptible to abuse in that it would conceivably be
easy for a patient who has not actually met these labeling requirements to obtain the drug. This potential for abuse undermines the
public health and patient safety concerns that motivate the labeling
requirements.
Moreover, the labeling requirement that the patient must have unsuccessfully sought treatment with an investigational drug does not
explicitly mention clinical trials.229 It is thus too ambiguous to
approximate the requirement that the patient must be unable to enter
into a clinical trial for the relevant drug. Also ripe for abuse, the requirement that the sponsor continue to pursue full market approval
following Tier I approval simply calls for an "assurance" that the
sponsor will do so. 2 30 The bill does not describe any procedures for
establishing compliance, and does not direct any administrative
agency to do so. 231 Thus, although the ACCESS Act takes steps
towards expanding access to investigational drugs, it ultimately does
not adequately protect the government's interests in protecting patient
best interests and promoting public health.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,
Congress instructed the FDA to ensure that "opportunities to participate in expanded access programs are available to every individual
with life threatening or serious debilitating illness for which there is
not effective therapy. 2 32 Eleven years later, the FDA has failed to
accomplish this goal. What is more, the government's interest in protecting patients from their own decision to take an investigational drug
does not justify the extent of the FDA's restrictions on access.
Because courts are not likely to establish a constitutional right to freedom from government interference with the pursuit of investigational
medical treatment following Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, proponents of expanded access must pursue reform through Congress,
which should direct the FDA to reform its overbroad regulations. By
implementing the legislative and regulatory recommendations presented here, Congress and the FDA can ease the strongly paternalistic
restrictions on access to investigational drugs without significantly
jeopardizing patient safety or public heaith.
229 See S. 1956 § 3(b)(5)(A)(i).
230 See id. at § 3(b)(1)(A)(iii).
231 See id. at § 1-7.
232
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Reg. 75147, 75149 (Dec. 14, 2006).

